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Lateral Movement Investigation

description

Investigate an escalated lateral-movement alert. Reconstructs the path an actor took between hosts — the source, the credentials used, the technique, and every asset reached — distinguishes admin or tooling traffic from an intruder pivoting, and returns a verdict with the full reached-asset scope and containment actions.

Lateral Movement Investigation

Runs on alerts escalated by triage (see endpoint-recon-lateral-movement): a host made an internal connection — remote service creation, WMI/WinRM execution, RDP, SMB admin-share access, or a pass-the-hash shape — that triage judged anomalous. Triage established the hop looked wrong; investigation reconstructs the whole path and its reach. The question is not "did a host connect to another" — it did — but "who drove it, with what credential, and everywhere it went."

Inputs

  • The escalated alert (source host, destination host(s), technique, account used, timing) and the triage report.
  • Authentication logs (Windows 4624/4648/4672, Kerberos, VPN), endpoint process and remote-execution telemetry, and internal flow logs. Anchor on the account and the source host and expand outward.

Investigation steps

Collect all four signals; the verdict is derived from them at the end.

1. Source and entry reconstruction — signal A

Establish where the movement originated and how the actor got onto the source host. Signal A fires when the source host itself has an open or recent compromise signal — an earlier flagged sign-in, a beacon, a malware detection — tying the movement to a known foothold rather than a standalone admin action.

2. Credential attribution — signal B

Identify the credential used to authenticate to the destination and how it was obtained. Signal B fires on stolen-credential shapes: pass-the-hash or pass-the-ticket (logon type / ticket anomalies), a service or admin account used from a host it never runs on, or a credential that appeared on the source host through dumping rather than interactive logon. Note the privilege level — movement escalating toward domain admin weighs heavily.

3. Technique and path scoping — signal C

Map every hop: from the source, enumerate all destinations reached with the same credential or technique in the window, then repeat from each reached host. Signal C fires when the path fans out across multiple hosts, uses living-off-the-land remote execution (PsExec-style service creation, WMI/WinRM, scheduled tasks) inconsistent with normal administration, and reaches assets the account has no operational reason to touch.

4. Objective and impact — signal D

On the reached hosts, look for what the movement was for: credential dumping, data staging, backup/shadow-copy tampering, new persistence, or sensitive-system access. Signal D fires when the path terminates in actions on objective — this confirms an intrusion over a misread admin task and sets the real blast radius.

Verdict rule

  • malicious: signal B or C plus A or D — stolen-credential or fan-out movement tied to a foothold or ending in actions on objective. Movement reaching a domain controller or backup infrastructure with stolen credentials is malicious on its own.
  • suspicious: an anomalous hop (C) with an unusual credential where the source foothold and objective can't be established but a sanctioned admin explanation can't be shown either.
  • inconclusive: the path can't be reconstructed because authentication or endpoint logs for the hosts are missing.
  • benign: the movement resolves to sanctioned administration — a jump-host, a patch/config tool, or an admin whose account, source, and targets positively match their documented role and baseline — with no foothold, no stolen-credential shape, and no actions on objective.

Output

Verdict

One of malicious / suspicious / inconclusive / benign, with the signals that decided it.

When not benign: isolate the source and every reached host, disable and rotate the credential used (and any credentials exposed on the path), revoke active sessions/tickets, preserve artifacts on the path for forensics, and hunt for the same credential and technique beyond the mapped hosts. Prioritize any domain-privileged or backup systems in the path.

Evidence

The reconstructed path (source → each hop with timestamps), the credential used and how it was obtained, the technique per hop, the full list of reached assets, the source host's foothold status, and any actions on objective found.

Reasoning

Name the signals and how they stacked — a beaconing workstation using a pass-the-hash admin credential to reach a file server and then a domain controller, dumping credentials on the way, is malicious; a backup service account touching its usual set of servers from the known backup host is benign.